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GPS TRACKING TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE
FOR REVISITING KNOTTS AND SHIFTING
THE SUPREME COURT'S THEORY OF
THE PUBLIC SPACE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Abstract: The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees
freedom from government intrusion into individual privacy. More than
two hundred years after the time of the Framers, however, the government
possesses technologies, like GPS tracking, that allow law enforcement to
obtain ever-greater amounts of detail about individuals without ever
setting foot inside the home—the area where Fourth Amendment
protections are highest. Despite the dangers GPS tracking and other
technologies present to individual privacy, the U.S. Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence frequently fails to acknowledge any
semblance of privacy in the public sphere. This Note argues that rather
than defining Fourth Amendment privacy based on purely physical
boundaries, a proper analysis would protect those features of society that
provide privacy. By recognizing that features other than physical boun-
daries can generate privacy, this analysis would ensure the Fourth Amen-
dment continues to preserve individual privacy even in the face of
sophisticated new technologies.
INTRODUCTION
Generations before the dawn of the twenty-first century, many
predicted the technological age would diminish the ability of ordinary
citizens to take refuge in their privacy—to remain secure from unwar-
ranted government intrusion. 1 Technological advances that allowed
police to "bug" phone lines and record conversations, for instance,
caused some to assert that George Orwell was on target in 1984 when
I See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern that "[wle are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone
is open to surveillance at all times"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that modern advancements meant Islubtler
and more far-reaching means of invading privacy" than physical intrusion were available).
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he described Oceania, a totalitarian society where Big Brother was
always watching and listening. 2
When Orwell published his novel in 1949, the world lacked the
technological skill to effectuate much of his ominous vision. 3 Orwell's
Telescreen, which enabled the Thought Police to monitor movements
and listen to conversations, likely seemed far-fetched in the 1950s. 4
What made Oceania alarming from a technological viewpoint, then,
was the suggestion that the government could possess the ability to
watch and record people's movements, words, and thoughts. 5
 In that
kind of world, privacy was nonexistent, and one constantly censored
one's behavior to align with accepted norms. 5
Orwell wrote in a time long before the Internet enabled the
widespread collection of data, before closed-circuit cameras were
regularly installed in public places, before computer databases pro-
vided for the seemingly endless cataloguing of data, and before the
Global Positioning System (the "GPS") permitted the continuous,
precise tracking of one's movements.? Such technological develop-
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 161, 164-65 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2223, 2226-27 (including comments by two senators who compared proposed fed-
eral law authorizing some government use of wiretapping to the launching of Orwell's
1984 society); Arthur J. Goldberg, Can We Afford Liberty?, 117 U. PA. L. Rev. 665, 667-69
(1969) (describing wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance, when not lim-
ited, as creating a society marked by the presence of Big Brother). See generally GEORGE
ORWELL, 1984 (1949); David P. Hodges, Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261 (1975) (discussing
privacy implications of electronic snooping technology).
See, e.g., Rand Richards Cooper, The Big Brother Test: When You Add It All Up, Does It
Come to 1984?, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 7, 2003, at 5; David Shenk, Watching You: The
World of High-Tech Surveillance, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 1, 2003, at 2; Eric Zorn, Commen-
tary: Orwellian Days Could BeJust Around Corners, CHI. Thin., July 15, 2003, at Cl. See generally
ORWELL, supra note 2.
4 See ORWELL, supra note 2, at 4; Cooper, supra note 3, at 5; Shenk, supra note 3, at 2;
Zorn, supra note 3, at Cl.
5 See Cooper, supra note 3, at 5; Shenk, supra note 3, at 2.
See Cooper, supra note 3, at 5; Shenk, supra note 3, at 2.
7 See generally Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. So. &
Tecu. L. 288 (2001) (discussing the effect of the Internet on personal privacy); John Shat-
tuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy in
the United States, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 991 (1984) (describing new technologies that made the
author wonder whether the society of 1984 had, in fact, arrived); Christopher Slobogin,
Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213
(2002) (discussing privacy and the monitoring of closed-circuit television cameras); Toby
Solomon, Personal Privacy and the "1984" Syndrome 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 753 (1985) (de-
scribing the impact of the computer on personal privacy); Waseem Karim, Note, The Pri-
vacy Implications of Personal Locators: Why You Should Think Twice Before Voluntarily Availing
Yourself to GPS Monitoring, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 485 (2004) (discussing privacy implica-
tions of GPS devices).
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ments have made it entirely possible, it seems, for many aspects of
people's lives to be monitored and recorded. 9 One might wonder,
then, how much room is left for personal privacy—and the liberty pri-
vacy affords.9
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was drafted by
the Framers to protect one aspect of personal privacy fundamental to
individual liberty: the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by the
government." Without probable cause and a warrant, the govern-
ment cannot enter and search a home or seize personal property."
But technology has made it easier for the government to acquire just
as much information about a person without ever setting foot inside a
home. 12 Thus, the question becomes whether technology has eroded
the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by
the U.S. Supreme Court. 13 So far; the answer seems to be yes, because
the Court continues to focus less on safeguarding the features that
enable people to maintain privacy, and more on the traditional physi-
cal boundaries that separate private from public."
GPS tracking is one technology that has raised privacy concerns
and the fear that the Fourth Amendment would fail to provide pro-
tection from indiscriminate police use. 15 Because GPS tracking de-
vices collect continuous, real-time location information, they offer
detailed descriptions of one's movements over time." Although one's
movements generally occur within the public space, the resulting cata-
logue of location data reveals a great deal about one's preferences,
friends, associations, and habits—and GPS tracking enables data col-
lection of a magnitude not feasible through mere visual surveillance."
Under the Supreme Court's current analysis, however, the Fourth
Amendment generally does not ,apply to activities occurring in the
See generally Helms, supra note 7; Shattuck, supra note 7; Slobogin, supra note 7;
Karim, supra note 7.
9 See generally Helms, supra note 7; Shattuck, supra note 7; Slobogin, supra note 7;
Karim, supra note 7.
1° See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV;
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Samuel D. Warren 8c Louis 17.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 205 (1890) (describing overall right to
privacy, not just that found in the Fourth Amendment, as a general "right to be let alone").
n See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 87, 212-214, 263 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 162-202 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 42-66 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 30-46, 254-256 and accompanying text.
17
 See infra notes 146-156, 247-256 and accompanying text.
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public space. 18 Thus, GPS tracking provides a case for shifting the Su-
preme Court's definition of public and private to an analysis that rec-
ognizes not only that technology has broken down traditional
boundaries between public and private, but also that it is possible to
maintain some privacy within the public space. 19
Part I of this Note introduces GPS tracking technology and de-
scribes the various privacy concerns and potential law enforcement
uses of GPS devices. 20 Part H outlines the framework of the Fourth
Amendment, highlighting the Supreme Court's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy doctrine." Part 111 begins to evaluate GPS tracking de-
vices under the Fourth Amendment and focuses on two Supreme
Court cases addressing the constitutionality of the use of beepers, a
more primitive tracking device. 22 Part IV discusses how the Supreme
Court has addressed the idea of privacy within the public space and
provides the basic criticisms privacy advocates have leveled against the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including criticism that
the Court's analysis has not kept pace with technological advances."
Part V then offers an argument for why GPS tracking should be
considered a search under the Fourth Amendment." Part V.A distin-
guishes GPS devices from beepers. 25 Part V.B proposes a shift in the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to reflect better the idea
that privacy can exist within the public space." This argument, based
in part on language in the Supreme Court's most recent Fourth
Amendment case, suggests that the Fourth Amendment should pro-
tect not only the physical areas people expect to be kept private, but
also those features of society that make possible the level of privacy
society expects.27 Such an analysis would better prevent technological
advances from further impinging on the freedom from government
intrusion guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 28 Finally, Part V.0
18 See infra notes 162-202 and accompanying text.
' 9 See infra notes 226-279 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 30-66 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 88-156 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 157-225 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 226-287 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 233-253 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 254-279 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 254-262 and accompanying text.
28 See info notes 263-270 and accompanying text.
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develops, as an alternative to Fourth Amendment protection, a statu-
tory framework for regulating police use of GPS technology. 29
I. THE NATURE OF GPS TRACKING TECHNOLOGY
A. How GPS Works
Originally designed by the Department of Defense for use by the
U.S. military, the GPS provides continuous, highly accurate, and reli-
able positioning and timing information to users." The system func-
tions through at least twenty-four satellites that broadcast precise time
signals while orbiting the earth." A GPS receiver processes the signals
of at least four satellites at any given time to determine mathemati-
cally the receiver's location, velocity, and time—anywhere in the
world, under any weather conditions.32
Although the most accurate positioning information initially was
reserved for military uses such as guiding missiles, the U.S. govern-
ment in 2000 granted civilian access to this capability, which pinpoints
latitude and longitude with an accuracy of between forty-eight and
sixty feet.33 Using a common process called differential GPS, which
incorporates additional correction signals to account for problems
like atmospheric interference, many GPS receivers have an accuracy
of between one and three meters." Satellite improvements expected
in 2005 and again in 201.2 eventually could make differential GPS ac-
curate to within thirty to fifty centimeters. 33
" See infra notes 280-287 and accompanying text.
" AHMED EL-RABBANY, INTRODUCTION TO GPS, THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 1
(2002).
31 SCOTT PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESSING NATIONAL POLI-
CIES 1 (1995). Twenty-nine satellites currently are in use. EL-RAUBANY, supra note 30, at 5.
52 EL-RABBANY, supra note 30, at 1-2,8-9.
" Mark Grossman & Allison K. Hift, GPS Technology: Know Where You Stand, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 7,2000, at 24; Kevin Washington, Locator System Draws Bead on Better Accuracy,
BALT. SUN, May 8, 2000, at IC, 2000 WLNR 1071694.
34
 Grossman & Hift, supra note 33, at 24; Washington, supra note 33, at 1C. Some GPS
receivers have limited capability inside buildings or in dense urban environments dotted
by skyscrapers, however, because the receivers have difficulty connecting to the satellites.
Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Cart 54, Where Are You ? The 7'racking System Knows, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2003, at G7. To circumvent this problem, some systems use technologies other than or in
combination with GPS, such as infrared, or radio frequency technologies to pin-
point locations in these areas. Id.
33 Loring Wirbel, Communications in Focus: GPS and Satellite, ELEC. ENG .G TIMES, Sept.
20, 2004, at 51.
666	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:661
Since President Ronald Reagan first granted civilian access to
GPS in 1983, civilian uses for the technology have exploded. 36 A pri-
mary initial civilian use was land surveying, but other applications
quickly followed in land, marine, and air navigation. 37 Most relevant
to privacy concerns, civilian inventors developed technology that can
track the location of individuals, vehicles, and objects."
The market for GPS services is growing rapidly; more than 5 mil-
lion consumer GPS units were shipped in 2003, up from 3.2 million
units in 2002.39 In fact, the global consumer GPS market now is ex-
pected to surpass $22 billion by 2008.° At least 42 million Americans
are expected to use some kind of "location-aware" technology in 2005. 41
B. GPS Tracking and Privacy
The pervasiveness and wide variety of uses of GPS-based tracking
devices has prompted concern from privacy advocates.42 Even though
the technology has many beneficial uses, such as allowing emergency
services to locate those in need of assistance or family members to
monitor the whereabouts of relatives suffering from Alzheimer's dis-
ease, privacy advocates question the full extent of the technology's
capabilities. 43 Parents wanting to keep track of their children can give
them GPS-enabled cellular phones and use software to track their lo-
36
 PACE ET AL., supra note 31, at 2. The military continues to use the system through
encrypted satellite signals reserved exclusively for the government. Seth Schiesel, On the
Ground in Iraq, the Best Compass Is the Shy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at Gl.
37 EL-RARBANY, supra note 30, at 10; PACE ET AL., supra note 31, at 2.
38 See EL-RABRANY, supra note 30, at 10; PACE ET AL., supra note 31, at 2.
s9 Wirbel, supra note 35, at 51.
49 Global Madtet to Top $22 Billion, GPS WORLD, Feb. 1, 2004, at 46.
41 Amy Harmon, Lost? Hiding? Your Cellphone Is Keeping Tabs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003,
at Al. The use of location-aware technology is due in part to federal regulations requiring
cell phone service providers to be able to pinpoint the location of 911 callers. See Wireless
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C. § 615 (2000) (ordering the Fed-
eral Communications Commission to 'encourage and support" state efforts to build wire-
less 911 service); FCC 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20,18 (2004) (requiring wireless carriers to
choose among various location-based technologies, including GPS, to enable phones on
their networks to pinpoint a caller's location within fifty meters for two-thirds of all calls,
and within one hundred fifty meters for ninety-five percent of all calls); Jeffrey Selingo,
What's Next: Protecting the Cellphcme User's Right to Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 5, 2004, at G7.
42 See, e.g., Becky Diercks, Location-Based Services: Finding Their Place in the Market, WIRE-
LESS WE., Mar. 15, 2003, at 56; Fitzgerald, supra note 34, at G7; Harmon, supra note 41, at
Al; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Privacy Eroding, Bit by Byte, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2004, at El;
Selingo, supra note 41, at G7.
43 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 41, at Al; Richard Willing, Surveillance Gets a Satellite As-
sist, USA TODAY, June 10, 2004, at 3A.
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cations, relying on the services to track them as long as the cell phone
is on—but some are concerned that others with more dangerous in-
tentions could obtain this information. Employers can give GPS-
equipped cell phones to their employees to determine if employee
on-site hours are accurate—but employees lament the lack of trust.*
Drivers can use GPS vehicle navigation systems to plot directions—but
a domestic abuser could attach a covert GPS device to his target's ve-
hicle and use it to terrorize her with how well he knows her location.*
One area of concern for privacy advocates regarding this tech-
nology is its covert surveillance potential on behalf of law enforce-
ment.47 For instance, police could approach a suspect's vehicle, mag-
netically attach a GPS tracking device to the vehicle's undercarriage,
and view data from the device over an Internet website—all unbe-
knownst to the suspect.* Because such systems can last for weeks at a
" Harmon, supra note 41, at Al. Because such systems typically provide access to loca-
tion information through the Internet, the data may be susceptible to hacking. See id.
45 Christopher Elliott, Some Rental Cars Are Keeping Tabs on the Drivers, N.Y. Times, Jan.
13, 2004, at C6; Harmon, supra note 41, at Al.
" John Schwartz, This Car Can Talk. What It Says May Cause Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2003, at Cl. For instance, a defendant was convicted in Kenosha, Wisconsin, in June
2003 for stalking his ex-girlfriend; he used a tracking device to obtain accurate location
information. Id. The police report indicated the woman "could not understand how the
defendant always knew where she was in her vehicle at all times." Id. Upon inspection of
her vehicle, police found a small black box near the radiator; the defendant had accessed
her location data by logging onto the Internet. Id. A similar stalking case occurred in
Colorado. See People v. Sullivan, 53 P.3d 1181, 1183-84 (Colo. App. 2002) (affirming con-
viction for stalking by concluding the defendant's monitoring of a GPS device attached to
the victim's vehicle constituted placing the victim "under surveillance" within the meaning
of the state's stalking statute, although the defendant did not physically follow the victim).
47 See, e.g., Richard C. Balough, Global Positioning System and the Internet: A Combination
with Privacy Risks, 15 Cm. BAR Ass'N REC. 28, 32-33 (2001); Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police
Track Your Wireless Calls? Call Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO Alm &
ENT. U. 381, 382-83 (2003); Karim, supra note 7, at 501-05; Harmon, supra note 41, at
Al; O'Harrow, supra note 42, at El; Schwartz, supra note 46, at Cl.
" See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 45, at C6 (indicating that because of the nature of some GPS
devices, rental car customers often have no way to determine physically whether their rented
vehicle is equipped with such a device). Companies manufacturing GPS tracking devices
often tout their small size and covert nature as part of their marketing schemes. E.g., COUN-
TER INTELLIGENCE TECHS., INC., GPS SATELLITE TRACKING/LOCA'T'ION SYSTEMS, at
http://www.spooktech.com/trackingeqmt/datalogger.shunl
 (last modified July 22, 2004)
(describing Datalogger II: The Scout, a covert GPS vehicle tracker that can operate for eight-
een days on four AA batteries, is 3" by 5" by 1.5", attaches magnetically to a vehicle undercar-
riage, and provides location data every ten seconds to an Internet website); COVERT GPS
VEHICLE TRACKING SYS., INC., GPS-WEB VEHICLE TRACKING SYSTEMS, at http://www.covert-
gps-vehicle-tracking-systems.com
 (last updated Apr. 6, 2005) (describing the GPS-Web system,
equipped with a GPS-Stealth antenna that can be placed deep under a vehicle because it
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time, depending on the type of battery used, police could acquire
constant, real-time, precise location information about that vehicle
for much longer than they practically might be able to maintain
round-the-clock visual surveillance.49
Another kind of GPS device available to law enforcement is the
personal tracking device, which is designed and priced for the average
citizen and often marketed as a way to quickly locate a person in an
emergency or to monitor young children. 5° Individuals wear the de-
vice like a wristwatch; location information can be accessed through
the Internet. 51
 The cellular phone also is a personal locator and one
of the fastest-growing markets for GPS and other location-based tech-
nologies.52
 The growth is spurred in part by the federal government's
requirement that cell phone service providers equip the cell phones
on their networks with technology that can locate 911 callers within
fifty to one hundred meters. 55
C. Law Enforcement Uses of GPS
Law enforcement officials have been loathe to discuss the fre-
quency with which their agencies use GPS tracking devices and the
purposes such devices are serving, although specific cases have come
to light." Perhaps the most highly publicized instance of GPS tracking
functions without maintaining a line of sight to satellites, and boasting a thirty-second mag-
netic installation and a fourteen-month battery life).
49 See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash, 2003) (en banc) (arguing it was im-
probable that law enforcement could have engaged in uninterrupted, twenty-four-hour
visual surveillance of the defendant); COUNTER INTELLIGENCE Twins., INC., supra note 48;
COVERT GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYS., INC., supra note 48.
5° Karim, supra note 7, at 486, 488-92.
5' Id. at 489-90 (detailing information about Wherify Wireless, Inc.'s Personal .Locator
devices and Digital Angel Corp.'s Digital Angel tracking device); Will Wade, Keeping Tabs: A
Two-Way Street, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at G1 (describing personal locator options).
52 Selingo, supra note 41, at G7.
53 Id.; see Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C, § 615
(2000); FCC 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2004).
54 Brendan L Koerner, Your Cell Phone Is a Homing Device, LEGAL. AFFAIRS, July—Aug.
2003, (citing difficulty in obtaining information about law enforcement GPS use from the
New York City Police Department and the U.S. Department of Justice), http://www.legal
affairs.oig/issues/July-August-2003/feature_koerner julaug03,html (last visited Apr. 15,
2005); Brendan Lyons, GPS Does the Legwork as Cops Track Suspects, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.), Oct. 5, 2004, at Al (discussing difficulty of obtaining information about how the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms uses GPS devices), 2004 WLNR 659983; Willing,
supra note 43, at 3A (noting that no national records of law enforcement use of GPS exist).
There is some indication, however, that GPS technology is readily available to law en-
forcement agencies from the federal government if local law enforcement intends to use
the technology in drug investigations. See U.S. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CON-
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occurred in connection with the Laci Peterson slaying case in Califor-
nia.55 During the criminal investigation of that case, police attached
GPS tracking devices between January and April 2003 to several vehi-
cles used by Scott Peterson, the primary suspect in the case." The de-
vices captured Peterson's movements as he traveled around Califor-
nia, including to a marina near where his wife Laci's body later
washed ashore. 57 At trial, prosecutors argued that this fact suggested,
circumstantially, that Peterson was connected to her death. 58 In an-
other prominent case, police in Spokane, Washington, used GPS de-
vices to track a murder suspect's movements in his vehicle for eight-
een days." Information from the devices revealed the suspect's travels
to a location fifty miles away, where police found the body of the nine-
year-old girl the suspect later would be convicted of killing.° Moreo-
ver, police have used GPS devices to track the location of "bait" cars,
which police set up to attract car thieves and catch them in the act. 61
The GPS devices in the "bait" cars can be rigged to alert police when a
TROL POLICY, COUNTERDRUG TECH. ASSESSMENT CFR., NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRAT-
EGY: COUNTERDRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BLUEPRINT UPDATE E-1, E-9 to E-10
(2003), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ctac03/
ctac03.pdf (last updated Feb. 13, 2003). GPS tracking devices are available through the
federal government's Technology Transfer Program, which provides technology equip-
ment and training free of charge to local law enforcement agencies fighting drug
trafficking and drug use. See id. at E-1 to E-5, E-9 to E-10. The program offers two kinds of
GPS equipment, the Advanced Vehicle Tracking System, which allows officers to "tag" and
track vehicles in real time, and the Sentinel Global Positioning System, which tracks and
logs vehicle location data. Id. at E-9 to E-10.,
55 See Stacy Finz & Michael Taylor, Peterson Tracking Device Called Flawed, Defense Wants
Evidence Shut Out of Trial SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2004, at A17, 2004 WLNR 7620927.
56 Id.
57 Id.
56 Id. At Peterson's trial for the murder of his wife and unborn child, the defense at-
tempted to block admission into evidence of the GPS tracking information, arguing it was
too unreliable to be admitted. Id. The tracking information revealed at least three glitches
during the time GPS devices were placed on Peterson's vehicles, amounting to eleven
minutes of faulty information in hours of location data. Id. After a hearing, the trial judge
decided to admit the evidence—the first time, according to analysts, that GPS tracking
device evidence was used in a criminal trial in California. Stacy Finz et al., Groundbreaking
Rule in Peterson Thal' Tracking Device Evidence Can Be Presented, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 18,
2004, at All, 2004 WLNR 7622924. A jury later convicted Peterson of the two murders and
sentenced him to death for the crimes. Dean Murphy, jury Says Scott Peterson Deserves to Die
for Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A20.
Finz &	 supra note 55, at A17.
60 Id.
61 E.g., Heather Ratcliffe, Police Sting Targets Cold-Weather Car Thieves, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 15, 2005, at 7 (describing St. Louis, Missouri's program), 2005 WLNR
609624.
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door is opened or the car moves. 62 Finally, law enforcement and cor-
rections officers use GPS tracking devices to monitor the location of
nonviolent offenders released on parole or defendants released pend-
ing trial; they can engineer the devices to warn themselves when an
individual travels to prohibited locations.°
Thus, law enforcement may find GPS technology useful in a variety
of contexts and for a variety of purposes, but what concerns privacy ad-
vocates is the tracking of suspects and those who have not yet been
convicted of any crime. 64
 Privacy advocates draw parallels between such
GPS tracking and the Orwellian state—one where the average citizen
must live and move about while knowing the government may be
watching and scrutinizing the individual's every movement65 If law en-
forcement discretion in using GPS devices can be checked by the U.S.
Constitution, such a safeguard must derive from the Fourth Amend-
ment, which, according to Justice Louis Brandeis in his famous descrip-
tion of privacy, protects "the right to be let alone" from government
intrusion—"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men."66
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants people
the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 67 The threshold inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment is whether police activities constituted
62 Id.
63 E.g., Kris Axtman, The Move to High-Tech Tracking of Inmates, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, May 7, 2004, at 2.
" See Wade, supra note 51, at G1 (outlining variety of uses of GPS technology).
66
 See Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN Dna()
L. Ray. 843, 882-85 (2002) (suggesting a variety of privacy-invasive police uses of GPS
technology); Schwartz, supra note 46, at Cl. See generally OR WELL, supra note 2.
66 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 205 (describing overall
right to privacy, not just that found in the Fourth Amendment, as a general bright to be let
alone").
67 The Fourth Amendment provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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a search or seizure.69 If no search or seizure occurred, the Fourth
Amendment does not apply. 69 If the activity was a search or seizure,
then it must have been reasonable in order to comply with the Fourth
Amendment." In most cases, a search of private property is reason-
able if it occurred pursuant to a warrant, based on probable cause
and issued by a neutral and detached magistrate." If, however, a
search occurred absent a valid warrant, its evidence must be excluded
at the defendant's subsequent criminal trial." Therefore, whether po-
lice action constitutes a search yields significant implications for po-
lice investigative techniques and procedure, as well as the conduct of
any resulting criminal trial."
Until the late 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly inter-
preted the Fourth Amendment to provide only the right to be free
from physical governmental trespass onto one's person or property. 74
68 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 739-40 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); California v. Ci-
raolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214-15 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1984);
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
7° See, e.g., New jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1968); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
71 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558-60 (2004); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31; Illinois
v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57; Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). Although the Supreme Court generally maintains its position
that searches conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, the Court has
recognized numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement, where a search will be rea-
sonable even without a warrant. See, e.g., Groh, 540 U.S. at 572 (Thomas,,., dissenting)
(discussing exceptions to the warrant requirement). For instance, the Court has recog-
nized that both an individual's lesser expectation of privacy in his automobile and the
mobility of the vehicle make it impracticable to require a warrant to search an automobile;
thus, a search of a vehicle can be reasonable without a warrant, so long as officers had
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 800 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-53 (1925). Moreover, searches
conducted in officers' good faith that a valid warrant exists, even when the warrant is
deficient, also are constitutional. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-09 (1984). Fi-
nally, the Court has dispensed with the warrant requirement for limited, brief searches and
seizures of a person, when officers have reasonable suspicion the individual is armed.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-27.
72
 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to state criminal
prosecutions); Weeks V. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914) (crafting exclusionary
rule and applying it to federal criminal prosecutions).
7° See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393-94.
m See, e.g., Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509-10 (holding the Fourth Amendment was violated
where police officers' eavesdropping techniques involved a physical penetration into the
defendants' premises); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928) (holding
no Fourth Amendment violation occurred where officers intercepted the defendants' wire
telephone calls by tapping wires located outside of the defendants' home).
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Regarding searches, the Court simply determined the location of law
enforcement officers at the time they acquired information about the
defendant; if officers had not committed a physical trespass into per-
sons, houses, papers, or effects, their actions were not considered a
search and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 75
This reliance on physical trespass shifted in 1967 with the seminal
Supreme Court case Katz v. United States, where the Court held for the
first time that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places." 76
Even though the language of the Fourth Amendment contains no ex-
plicit reference to privacy, the Court indicated that the heart of the
Fourth Amendment protects an individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy from government intrusion. 77
 Under the Court's analysis,
sharpened by Justice John M. Harlan's concurring opinion, there
were two requirements to find an individual had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy worthy of protection. 78
 First, a person must have ex-
hibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, the expecta-
tion must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 79
By this logic, the Katz majority attempted to make Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence reflect societal notions of privacy. 80 The
context of the case suggests the Justices were mindful of the effect of
technological advances, which gave police access to information with
no physical intrusion required.in In Katz, FBI agents installed an elec-
tronic listening and recording device on the outer wall of the phone
booth in which the defendant had made a telephone call. 82 The Court
held that by entering the phone booth and closing the door, the de-
75 See, e.g., Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509-10 (holding that physical penetration into the de-
fendants' home constituted a Fourth Amendment violation); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129,134-36 (1942) (holding no Fourth Amendment violation occurred where
officers did not physically enter the defendant's office); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456-66
(holding no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when officers did not penetrate the
defendants' home); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57,58-59 (1924) (holding no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred when officers trespassed onto the defendant's land but did
not trespass into his home).
76 389 U.S. at 351.
" See id. at 351-53; see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
78 See id. at 351-53; id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79 See id. at 351-53; id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8° See id. at 351-53, 359; see also id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). In articulating the
contours of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Court distinguished Fourth
Amendment privacy from a general societal right to privacy. Id. at 350-51. The Fourth
Amendment protects an individual only against certain kinds of governmental intrusions,
whereas state law protects a person's general "right to be let alone by other people." Id.
51 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
82 Id. at 348.
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fendant sought to exclude others, and his actions allowed him to pre-
sume his conversations would not be "broadcast to the world." 83 The
government's conduct in recording that conversation, then, violated
his justifiable expectation of privacy—even absent physical intrusion
into the phone booth." By justice Harlan's more precise articulation,
not only did the defendant's actions show he had a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy regarding his phone booth conversation, but his ex-
pectation was one society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. 83
The Court has followed this standard in subsequent cases by rec-
ognizing that physical intrusion does not completely control the
Fourth Amendment analysis. 80 Nevertheless, in its attempt to define
what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court often
has turned to definitions of place and physical intrusion, particularly
when grappling with the challenging privacy issues raised by the con-
stant march of technology. 87
83 Id. at 352.
84 See id. at 353.
a3 Id. at 361 (Harland., concurring). Neither the Court norfustice Harlan elaborated
further on why the defendant's expectation of privacy in the phone booth was reasonable.
See id. at 352; id. at 361 (Harland., concurring). Indeed, the fact that Katz failed to provide
further guidance on what makes an expectation of privacy 'reasonable" lies at the heart of
the debate about the applicability of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
Idiot L. REV. 801, 808 (2004); David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Com-
mon Law, 72 Mtss. L.J. 143, 157-60 (2002).
8° See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (finding that a Fourth Amendment search occurred,
even absent physical intrusion into the defendant's home); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 (1978) (noting that Fourth Amendment analyses are not tied to invasions of property
interests recognized at common law); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589-92 (1974)
(holding that taking paint scrapings from tires of car parked in public parking lot did not
amount to a search, despite police physical manipulation of tires).
87 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30 (holding the use of a thermal imager directed at the
defendant's home was a search, despite a lack of a physical intrusion, because the technol-
ogy allowed access to information otherwise unobtainable without a physical intrusion);
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448-52 (1989) (holding the aerial observation of curtilage by
officers on a helicopter flying four hundred feet above the area was not a search because
no physical intrusion occurred); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988)
(holding no search occurred, despite the physical intrusion into trash bags left at the curb
outside a home); Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 235-39 (1986) (holding the aerial observation of
the area surrounding a factory was not a search because no physical intrusion occurred);
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-15 (holding the aerial observation of the curtilage of a home was
not a search because it occurred in a 'physically nonintrusive manner" from an airplane
flying at an altitude of one thousand feet); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-16
(1984) (holding the monitoring of a beeper tracking device while the beeper was inside a
home constituted a search, even absent the physical intrusion into the home); see also
Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some
Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. Rev. 119, 120-24 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court
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GPS TRACKING UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet evaluated the installation or
monitoring of GPS tracking devices under the Fourth Amendment."
The Court has, however, analyzed "beepers," an earlier, simpler form
of tracking device." The Court's cases involving several other tech-
nologies used in law enforcement also could influence a constitu-
tional analysis of GPS tracking."
The use of a GPS tracking device in the criminal investigation of
a suspect requires two steps on the part of police. 91
 First, police must
install the device on the suspect's vehicle or on an item belonging to
the suspect, and second, police must monitor the functioning of the
device or otherwise access the location information the GPS device
collects.92
 If the installation of the device constitutes a search or sei-
zure implicating the Fourth Amendment, a court would not reach the
monitoring issue because a search warrant is required for the installa-
has struggled to develop a consistent analysis in light of technology); Lewis R. Katz, In
Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 Iwo. L.J. 549, 562-65 (1990)
(arguing that the Court's subsequent application of the Katz test has failed to fulfill the
original goals of that decision); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technology, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1312-21 (2002) (sug-
gesting that Supreme Court cases post-Katz have improperly focused on the methods and
location of the search, rather than its results, as the Katz decision suggested); Christopher
Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo 's Rules Govern-
ing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1406-07 (2002) (discussing Supreme
Court cases highlighting the importance of the place observed by law enforcement); Dan-
iel McKenzie, Note, What Were They Smoking?: The Supreme Court's Latest Step in the Long
Strange Trip Through the Fourth Amendment, 93 J. Caw. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 153, 183-87
(2003) (noting the difficulties with the application of the Katz test); Paul St. Lawrence,
Note, Kyllo: As Libertarian Defense Against Orwellian Enforcement, 1 GEO. J.L. & Poe. POL'Y
155, 159-62 (2002) (same).
92 See, e.g., Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost? The Government Knows Where You Are:
Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 103, 107 (1998) (noting the lack of a Supreme Court decision on GPS technology).
e9 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708-10 (1984) (beeper); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277-79 (1983) (beeper). For details about how beepers function, see
infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
9° See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30, 34 (2001) (thermal imager); Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448-50 (1989) (helicopter); Dow Chem, Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227, 229-31 (1986) (small plane and aerial mapping camera); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 209, 213 (1986) (small plane); Karo, 468 U.S. at 708-11 (beeper); Knotts, 460 U.S.
at 277-79, 281 (beeper); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737, 741 (1979) (pen register
recording telephone numbers dialed by the defendant on his telephone).
91 See Kam, 468 U.S. at 713; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279 & n.**; Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts:
Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 299-300 (1985).
92 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713; Knott; 460 U.S. at 279 & n.**; Note, supra note 91, at 299-300.
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tion.93 If the installation does not constitute a search, or if police at-
tempt to obtain information from a tracking device pre-installed on a
vehicle or item, then a court would reach the monitoring issue. 94 This
Note focuses on whether the monitoring of a GPS tracking device is a
search under the Fourth Amendment."
A. U.S. Supreme Court Case Law: Beepers and the Fourth Amendment
In 1983, in United States v. Knotts, the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressed for the first time whether the monitoring of a tracking device
constitutes a search."' In that case, police used a beeper tracking de-
vice to track contraband possessed by suspects. 97 The Knotts beeper
was a battery-operated radio transmitter that issued an intermittent
signal which police could pick up with a radio receiver. 98 To receive
the signal and thereby determine the beeper's location, police used a
receiver within the physical range of the beeper; absent police pres-
ence in the vicinity, the tracking device provided no location data. 99
GPS tracking devices, alternatively, generally do not require police to
remain nearby to monitor a receiver because location information
gathered by GPS tracking devices usually can be accessed simply by
visiting an Internet web site.'"
In Knotts, the respondent's codefendant purchased a drum of
chloroform, into which officers had installed a beeper, and placed it
into his car. 191 Police officers then followed the car, using a combina-
tion of visual surveillance and a monitor in their vehicle that received
the signals emitted by the beeper.'" After the drum was transferred to
the vehicle of another codefendant and that codefendant made eva-
sive maneuvers, police lost visual contact with the car.'" They re-
'13 See Kam, 468 U.S. at 713; Knout, 460 U.S. at 279 & n.**; Note, supra note 91, at 299-300.
94 See Kam, 468 U.S. at 713; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279 & n.**; Note, supra note 91, at 299-300.
95 See infra notes 96-156 and accompanying text.
" 460 U.S. at 277.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See id. at 277-78 (describing how police monitored the beeper to acquire location
information).
ISO See, e.g., COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TECHS., INC., supra note 48; COVERT GPS VEHICLE
TRACKING SYS., INC., supra note 48.
101 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. The respondent did not challenge the warrantless installa-
tion of the beeper into a five-gallon drum of chloroform. Id. at 279 & n.". Before install-
ing the device, police obtained the consent of the chloroform producer; the respondent's
codefendants purchased the beeper-laden drum from the company. Id. at 278.
'" Id.
'° Id.
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gained contact later, after a monitoring device in a helicopter picked
up the signal.'" The signal revealed the beeper was stationary, indi-
cating the drum was located in the vicinity of a cabin. 195 At this point,
police stopped monitoring the beeper. 106
 Relying on the location in-
formation acquired by the beeper and additional visual surveillance
of the cabin, police obtained a warrant to search the cabin, which re-
vealed an illicit drug laboratory. 107
To determine whether the monitoring of the beeper violated the
Fourth Amendment, the Court employed the Katz v. United States teal"
The Court concluded that although the respondent may have had a
subjective expectation of privacy in his movements, demonstrated by
his evasive maneuvers, this was not an expectation society would recog-
nize as reasonable. 109
 Reasoning that monitoring the beeper was analo-
gous to following the vehicle on public streets and highways, the Court
held the codefendant "voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to
look" both his movements and the nature of the stops he made." 0
In essence, the Court equated the use of a tracking device with the
mere physical observation of the vehicle to hold there was no reason-
able expectation of privacy in one's movements in public." Although
the tracking device allowed police to continue surveillance even when
they lost visual contact, the Court said this fact did not change the
analysis because the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the police
from enhancing the capabilities of their senses with new technology.'"
The respondent had argued that such a holding would allow po-
lice to conduct, outside of judicial knowledge, twenty-four-hour sur-
veillance of anyone, but the Court was unconvinced of the possibility
absent specific examples of police abuse. 119 The Court stated, how-
ever, that if such "dragnet-type law enforcement practices" should oc-
cur, that would be the time to reevaluate its reasoning." Until then,
the mere fact that the beeper allowed law enforcement to be more
I" Id.
I° Id. at 278-79.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278-79.
107
	 at 279.
ma Id. at 280-81.
1°9 See id. at 281.
"° Id. at 281-82; see also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,574-75 (1988) (holding
that police following a suspect to determine where he was going and driving alongside him
for a short distance was not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
"' Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
"2 Id.
113 Id. at 283.
114 Id. at 284.
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effective or efficient in conducting vehicle surveillance did not raise
Fourth Amendment concerns. 115
The Knotts Court specifically left open the question of whether
monitoring the beeper after the chloroform drum had entered the
cabin would have violated the Fourth Amendment. 116 The Court ad-
dressed that issue a year later in 1984 in United States v. Karo. 1 " The
fact that the case involved a home shifted the Court's analysis. 118
In Karo, agents from the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (the
"DEA") reacted to a tip from an informant that the defendants had
ordered, from the informant's company, fifty gallons of ether, an in-
gredient often used in cocaine production. 119 With the informant's
consent, DEA agents substituted their own can of ether, in which they
had installed a beeper, for one can of the ten-can shipment. 120 The
agents watched the respondent pick up the ether shipment from the
informant and then followed the respondent to his house, using a
combination of visual and beeper surveillancegi
At times relying on only the beeper signal, agents tracked the can
of ether as it was moved among codefendants' homes and eventually to
a commercial storage facility. 122 Realizing the beeper was not sensitive
enough to reveal which storage locker contained the ether can, agents
subpoenaed storage company records to learn which locker a codefen-
dant had rented. 123 Agents continued to use the beeper to locate the
ether as the respondent and his codefendants moved the can among
storage facilities; eventually, using a combination of beeper and visual
surveillance, the agents tracked the ether can to a house the codefen-
116 Id. at 284-85. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall, expressed concern in a concurring opinion over the Court's sweeping
language related to increased law enforcement efficiency due to technology. Id. at 288
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that Katz involved a technological en-
hancement used in a manner that violated the Fourth Amendment. Sec id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Thus, although Justice Stevens thought the beeper was used appropriately in
Know, it by no means follow(ed) that the use of electronic detection techniques does not
implicate especially sensitive concerns.' Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
116
 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. The Court noted the record did not indicate the beeper
was used to reveal information about the movement of the drum inside the cabin. Id.
" 7 468 U.S. at 707.
118 Id. at 714-15.
119 Id. at 708.
12° Id.
121 Id. When the officers lost visual contact, they relied solely on the beeper to assist
them in regaining location information. Id.
122 Kam, 468 U.S. at 708-10.
123 Id. at 708.
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darts had rented.'" At that point, because the agents wanted to avoid
detection, they relied on the beeper to determine periodically if the
ether can still was in the house. 125 Based in part on information ob-
tained through the beeper monitoring, agents secured a warrant to
search the codefendants' homes, where they found evidence sufficient
to arrest the respondent on drug charges. 126
In evaluating whether the monitoring of the beeper was a search,
the Court first implicitly accepted Knotts's rationale regarding the
constitutionality of DEA officers' monitoring of the beeper as it
moved on public thoroughfares. 127
 The monitoring of the beeper
while it was in a private residence, however, raised different con-
cerns. 128
 After noting that there is a heightened expectation of privacy
inside a home, the Court stated that the beeper allowed the DEA
agents to obtain information about activities occurring inside a pri-
vate residence—namely, whether the beeper-laden ether can was pre-
sent inside the home. 129
Even though the electronic monitoring was less intrusive than a
physical search, the Court reasoned, it still revealed information about
the inside of a home that the DEA agents could not have known with-
out entering the residence.'" Therefore, monitoring the beeper while
it was inside the home constituted a search."' Because the search was
conducted without a warrant, it violated the Fourth Amendment.'"
124 Id. at 709.
122
 Id. at 709-10.
126 Id. at 710.
127 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-14.
138 Id. at 714.
129 Id. at 714-15. The Court noted that the monitoring of the beeper while it was in-
side the storage facility did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the beeper did not
reveal which locker contained the beeper and ether can. Id. at 720. Thus, unlike the moni-
toring of the beeper while it was in the home, this monitoring did not tell the DEA agents
anything about the contents of the locker. Id. at 715,720-21.
130 Id. at 715.
121 Id. at 716.
132 Kara, 468 U.S. at 719. The government also asserted that requiring a warrant to
monitor a beeper while it was inside a home amounted to requiring a warrant for all beeper
uses, because law enforcement could not know prior to monitoring whether the beeper
would travel inside a home. Id. at 718. The Court rejected this argument, saying it was not
convincing enough to dispense with the warrant requirement. Id. The Court also indicated
that law enforcement officers should have no difficulty describing with sufficient particular-
ity the place to be searched as they apply for a warrant. Id. Although police would not know,
before monitoring, where the beeper would travel, they could specify on the warrant appli-
cation the object in which the beeper would be placed, the circumstances leading officers to
desire using a beeper, and the time period they would monitor the beeper. Id.
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B. Federal Statute on Tracking Devices
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Knotts and Kara, Congress
in 1986 addressed jurisdictional aspects of the use of tracking devices
through a federal statute.'" The statute provides no guidance as to
when the use of a tracking device is justified; instead, it states that
courts otherwise authorized to issue a warrant or other order for the
installation of such a device can authorize the use of the device out-
side the court's own jurisdiction.' 34 Thus, because the statute does not
require police to obtain court orders before installing or monitoring a
tracking device, it does not guide law enforcement usage of tracking
devices but merely solves jurisdictional problems that arise when po-
lice track individuals across state lines.'"
In fact, at least two lower courts have concluded the statute does
not specifically prohibit police from installing and monitoring a track-
ing device without a court order, nor does the statute mandate exclu-
sion of evidence obtained through use of a tracking device in contra-
vention of the statute. 136 Finally, the statute's definition of "tracking
device" may be somewhat outdated, given that GPS technology can be
included in devices that have purposes besides tracking, such as cell
phones. 137 Therefore, the federal statute concerning tracking devices
1" See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2000).
"4 See id. § 3117(a).
1" See id.; see also United Stites v, Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 757 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(explaining the rationale behind § 3117 as curing jurisdictional problems that accompa-
nied the use of tracking devices).
1 " United States v, Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that even if a cell
phone constituted a tracking device under § 3117, the statute provided no basis for exclud-
ing evidence derived from its use without a § 3117 court order), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. by Garner v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1050 (2005); Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758 (holding
that § 3117 contains a basis for authorizing the use of tracking devices but does not bar
uses of tracking devices that do not comply with that statute and further holding that
§ 3117 does not exclude evidence acquired without a § 3117 order).
1" See Forest, 355 F.3d at 950. In United States v. Forest, DEA agents obtained a court or-
der to intercept cellular communications between the two defendants. Id. at 947. The
agents also followed defendants' vehicles periodically. Id. When law enforcement lost visual
contact with the defendants' vehicle, they dialed one defendant's cell phone without let-
ting it ring and used data obtained from the defendant's cellular service provider to ascer-
tain which cellular transmission towers had just been "hit" by signals from the defendant's
phone. Id. at 947. The cell-site data showed the location of the cell phone, allowing the
federal agents to resume visual tracking of the defendants. Id. At trial and on appeal, the
defendants claimed that this use of the cell phone converted the phone into a tracking
device. Id. at 948. Even though interception of wire and oral communications is governed
by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which prohibits
law enforcement interception of communications except under controlled circumstances,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the use of cell-site data was not a
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is not intended to provide guidance for law enforcement's use of GPS
devices, nor does it prevent abuse of the technology.n8
C. Case Law Addressing GPS Tracking
Only a few courts have specifically considered whether the moni-
toring of GPS tracking devices is distinguishable from the monitoring
of the beepers used in Knolls and Karo. 138 Moreover, only a few courts
have mentioned the possible constitutional implications of the moni-
toring of GPS tracking devices. 1445
 Two federal courts have ignored or
declined to address the monitoring issue, another federal court has
held monitoring a GPS device was not a search by relying on the
Knotts reasoning, and two state courts have held monitoring a GPS
device constituted a search on state law grounds."'
In perhaps the most prominent case addressing GPS tracking, the
Washington Supreme Court held in 2003 in State v. Jackson that the
monitoring of a GPS tracking device constitutes a search requiring a
"communication" within the meaning of the statute and that, at any rate, the Act
specifically excluded information derived from tracking devices. Id. at 948-50; see also Tide
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
138 See 18 U.S.C. § 3117; Forest, 355 F.3d at 950; Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758.
I " See United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467-68 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding
monitoring of GPS device directly analogous to monitoring of beepers used in Knott*
United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367-68 (D. Md. 2004) (noting similarities and
differences between beepers and GPS tracking devices, but declining to decide whether
monitoring of GPS device constituted search); see also People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 2004
WL 1040676, at *4-8 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. May 6, 2004) (unpublished decision) (re-
viewing GPS case law but declining to address similarities between GPS devices and beep-
ers); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 222-24 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (declining to consider
Kam and Knotts because GPS tracking devices constituted search on state-law grounds); cf.
Forest, 355 F.3d at 950-51 (holding use of cell-site data to determine location did not con-
stitute search because data revealed defendants' movements on public roads; defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements and in his cell-site data).
140
 See United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (evaluating
the constitutionality of the installation of a GPS device); Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 467-68
(holding monitoring a GPS device was not a search because police could have attained the
same information through visual surveillance); Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 368 (declining to
decide whether monitoring a GPS tracking device on a vehicle constituted a search); Lacey,
2004 WL 1040676, at *7-8 (holding monitoring a GPS device attached to a vehicle was a
search under the New York constitution); Jackson, 76 P.3d at 224 (holding monitoring a
GPS device attached to a vehicle was a search under the Washington constitution).
141
 Sce McIver, 186 F.3d at 1123, 1127 (ignoring monitoring issue); Moran, 349 F.
Supp. 2d at 467-68 (relying on Knotts to conclude the monitoring of a GPS device was not
a search); Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 368 (declining to decide the monitoring issue); Lacey,
2004 WL 1040676, at *7-8 (holding monitoring a GPS device was a search under the state
constitution); Jackson, 76 P.3d at 264 (same).
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warrant under the Washington State Constitution. 142 In Jackson, police
obtained warrants to impound and search two vehicles belonging to
the defendant, who was suspected of murdering his daughter.'" While
the vehicles were impounded, police installed GPS tracking devices;
officers then returned the vehicles to the defendant without inform-
ing him the tracking devices had been installed.'" By downloading
data from the GPS devices through the Internet, police learned of the
defendant's movements to a location where he had dumped the
child's body."9
Acknowledging that the Washington version of the Fourth
Amendment is broader in scope than the federal Fourth Amendment,
the Washington court held that GPS tracking required a warrant under
the state constitution. 148 The court reasoned that GPS was a "particu-
larly intrusive method of surveillance" because it did not merely aug-
ment the senses; rather, it served as a total substitute for visual tracking
and therefore was distinguishable from other sense-augmenting devices
like binoculars.ul Also pointing out that police obtained GPS data over
the course of two and one-half weeks, the court stated it was unlikely
police could have continued such constant twenty-four-hour visual sur-
veillance throughout that period. 149 In this vein, the court explicitly re-
jected the notion that GPS tracking equated to following the defendant
as he traveled on public roads." 9
142 See 76 P.3d at 224.
143 Id. at 220,
144
	 at 220-21. Police obtained the following three warrants for the defendant's ve-
hicles: (1) a warrant to impound and search the vehicles, (2) a ten-day warrant to install
the GPS devices, and (3) a ten-day warrant to maintain the GPS devices. Id. Because police
had relied on valid warrants, their use of GPS devices did not violate the state constitution.
Id. at 220.
149 Id. at 221.
146 Id. at 220, 222.
147 Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223-24. Under Washington case law, no search occurs if police
officers acquire information from a lawful vantage point through their senses. Id. at 222.
"However, a substantial and unreasonable departure from a lawful vantage point, or a par-
ticularly intrusive method of viewing, may constitute a search." Id. (quoting State v. Young, 867
P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994) (alteration in original)). Furthermore, Washington case law
looks to the kind of information gathered by police in the given situation; this analysis
assists Washington courts in determining whether a given expectation of privacy is "one
which a citizen of this state should be entitled to hold." Id.
148 Id. at 223.
149 Id. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland hinted at similar
reasoning in United States ts Berry. See 300 F. Supp. 2d at 368. That court did not directly
reach the issue of whether the monitoring of the GPS device police had placed on the
defendant's vehicle constituted a search because police had obtained a court order to
install the device. Id. The court noted, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court's beeper
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The court bolstered its reasoning by holding that the informa-
tion available through a GPS device is extensive.'" A GPS tracking
device can show a detailed record of the individual's life—everywhere
the person has been, when, and for how long, which in turn reveals
preferences, habits, associations, and eccentricities. 151 Given this level
of detail, the Jackson court held that a check on police power, through
the warrant requirement, was necessary to protect Washington citi-
zens' right to be free from this kind of government intrusion. 152
Thus, even though GPS devices are a kind of location tracking
device, they may be different from the beeper version because they
last longer, are much more accurate (currently to within one to three
feet), and do not require police presence in the vicinity to provide
data. 153 So, GPS tracking devices might represent the kind of "drag-
net-type" twenty-four-hour surveillance capabilities to which the Court
alluded, with some disapproval, in Knotts. 154 At the heart of this in-
quiry under the federal Constitution, however, is whether the infor-
mation a GPS tracking device collects is the kind of information in
which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 155 Be-
cause the U.S. Supreme Court in Knotts relied significantly on the no-
tion that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's travels
along public streets, any evaluation of GPS tracking technology relates
analysis under Knotts and Karo may not apply to GPS devices. Id. at 367-68. On the one
hand, the particular GPS device used was distinguishable from beepers because it did not
provide real-time location information and thus did not assist authorities in following the
defendant's vehicle. Id. at 368. Authorities in Berry accessed the location data by download-
ing it from the GPS device; such a device or more sophisticated versions, the court said,
could store movements continually over days, weeks, or years—potentially making the
device more intrusive than a beeper. Id. On the other hand, the court reasoned, a GPS
"merely records electronically what the police could learn if they were willing to devote the
personnel necessary to tail a car around the clock," so GPS might simply constitute a more
sophisticated version of the beeper. Id.
Jackson, 76 P.M at 223.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 224; see also Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *7-8 (finding that the installation and
monitoring of GPS tracking device installed on vehicle undercarriage violated the New
York version of the federal Fourth Amendment). The Lacey court reasoned that "individu-
als must be given the constitutional protections necessary to their continued unfettered
freedom from a 'big brother' society. Other than in the most exigent circumstances, a
person must feel secure that his or her every movement will not be tracked except upon a
warrant based on probable cause ...." Id. at *7
155 See Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 367-68; Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223-24; ElAtABBANY, supra
note 30, at 1-2, 5, 8-9; PAGE ET AL., supra note 30, at 1; Grossman & I-lift, supra note 33, at
24; Washington, supra note 33, at 1C; Wirbel, supra note 35, at 51.
154 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
155 See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
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to the base issue of whether citizens reasonably can expect a measure
of privacy within the public space. 156
N. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY WITHIN THE PUBLIC SPACE
Whether one can possess a legitimate expectation of privacy within
the public space was highlighted by the U.S. Supreme Court for the
first time in Katz v. United States.'" The Court stated that what a person
"knowingly exposes" to the public cannot be the subject of Fourth
Amendment protection, but what one attempts to keep private, even in
areas readily accessible to the public, can be protected. 158 Thus, the
Katz Court recognized that the distinction between the public and the
private realm may not always be a bright line, nor may it always be de-
termined by purely physical boundaries. 159 The contours of this distinc-
tion bear on an analysis of GPS tracking because one's location, except
one's location within a home or other structure, technically is exposed
to the public. 160 Therefore, it is helpful to turn to an analysis of how the
Court has interpreted Katz's "knowingly expose[d]" language, how it
has addressed Fourth Amendment protections in the public space, and
the common criticisms of the Court's approach, particularly in relation
to new forms of technology. 161
A. Defining "Public" and "Private" Based on Physical Boundaries
Even though Katz indicated the Fourth Amendment "protects
people, not places," the U.S. Supreme Court since Katz has placed
much weight on physical boundaries in determining whether an indi-
vidual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 162 In analyzing police's
156 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-84; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
157 See 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
158 Id.
159
 See id.
156 See id.; see also United States v, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
161 See 389 U.S. at 351-52; see also supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
152 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding
a reasonable expectation of privacy just exists inside the home); California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1988) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in trash
bags left outside a home at a curb accessible to the public); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 213-14 (1986) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a fenced-in
backyard, where the backyard was visible to the public from a plane flying overhead);
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-16 (1984) (holding a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists in an item's travels inside a home, because the indoor travels were withdrawn
from public view); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-79 (1984) (holding no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy exists in open fields that were not immediately adjacent to a
home); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82 (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in
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use of beepers in United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo, the
Supreme Court distinguished between public and private activities,
relying on physical boundaries to demarcate the line between the
two.163
 Monitoring the beeper used in Karo became a search only
when the container in which it was placed entered a home—a private
place delineated by its physical boundaries.lim Conversely, the moni-
toring of the beeper in Knolls never constituted a search because gov-
ernment agents monitored the beeper only as it traveled on roads and
streets—public places existing outside physical boundaries. 165
The Court's distinction between public and private thus focuses
heavily on whether police action has crossed physical boundaries. 166
In turn, the analysis also assumes that whatever exists outside those
boundaries is not private. 167 The constitutionality of a GPS tracking
device, then, might center on the fact that much of the location in-
formation obtained by GPS tracking devices is "public" by this
definition. 168 Like the tracking information provided by the beeper in
Knotts, the location information obtained by a GPS tracking device
attached to a vehicle would concern the device's movement in public
places—along roads and streets. 169 By contrast, a GPS personal locator
device worn on a wristband would concern activities and movements
occurring in public, as the person traveled along roads and streets, as
travels over public roads because a car's occupants and contents are in plain view of the
public); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583,590 (1974) (plurality opinion) (holding a lesser
expectation of privacy exists in a motor vehicle because a car has "little capacity for escap-
ing public scrutiny" in its use on public roads); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,743-44
(1979) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in phone numbers dialed
from a private telephone in a home, because the numbers are voluntarily conveyed to a
third party outside the home—the phone company).
163 See Kam, 468 U.S. at 714-15; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
164 See 468 U.S. at 714-16.
166 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
166
 See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text.
167 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting
the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. ItEv. 1349,1371-74
(2004) (outlining the Supreme Court's focus on physical location since Katz); St. Law-
rence, supra note 87, at 163-64 (suggesting that the pre-Kyllo Court treated privacy as an
absolute that exists or does not exist based on physical boundaries, despite the amount of
detail provided by forms of enhanced visual surveillance); supra note 162.
16a See Karr, 468 U.S. at 714-16; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82; see also Blitz, supra note 167,
at 1384-88 (evaluating Karo and Knolls and suggesting that although tracking technology
has changed since the two cases, a court still would grapple with their reasoning).
166 See 460 U.S. at 281-82.
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well as movements occurring in, private, as the person moved about
inside a home.I 7°
Commentators have criticized the rationale that physical bounda-
ries determine the line between public and private for a variety of rea-
sons, but perhaps the most frequent objection is based on a sense that
American citizens likely do not expect to lose virtually all privacy when
they step outside their front doors and outside the physical boundaries
of their homes.I 7I By contrast, the commentators note, there can be
such a thing as finding privacy in public—taking refuge in the anonym-
ity a public space provides.I 72 Therefore, they argue, if the "reasonable
1" See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-16; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82; see also Lee, supra note 47, at
392-94 (analyzing cell phone location data under the Fourth Amendment); Karim, supra
note 7, at 509-12 (analyzing GPS personal locators under the Fourth Amendment); Wer-
degar, supra note 88, at 106-09 (analyzing cell phone location data under the Fourth
Amendment).
171 E.g., Blitz, supra note 167, at 1406-13 (noting a series of objections to the Supreme
Court's holdings finding no expectation of privacy in public); Colb, supra note 87, at 120-
26 (arguing that degrees of privacy exist, in contrast to the Court's all-or-nothing ap-
proach); Katz, supra note 87, at 565-66 (suggesting that although people expose numerous
aspects of their daily lives to others each day, they do so believing their information will be
restricted to a certain purpose and group of people); Werdegar, supra note 88, at 111 (sug-
gesting that people expect to be anonymous in a crowd while moving about in public).
Even while privacy advocates condemn the Court's place-based distinctions between
the public and private spheres, they also acknowledge the difficulties of creating a work-
able Fourth Amendment jurisprudence if the line between public and private were less
demarcated by place. See Blitz, supra note 167, at 1412-13; Katz, supra note 87, at 562-63. If
the Court's focus on place and physical boundaries fails to protect privacy fully, in their
view, at least it delineates recognized private spaces, such as the home. See Blitz, supra note
167, at 1412. Moreover, privacy advocates also indicate that any Fourth Amendment analy-
sis of public and private must consider the fact that much legitimate police investigation
occurs in the public space—the one area where police may be free to be the most vigorous
in their pursuit of criminals. See id. at 1413; see also Ciraole, 476 U.S. at 213 (suggesting that
observation from a public place is "precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis
for a warrant"). To preserve police investigative ability, police would need strong guidance
regarding the permissibility of their actions under the Fourth Amendment; such guidance
is easier to provide if public and private spaces are defined by physical boundaries. See
Blitz, supra note 167, at 1413.
170 See, e.g., Blitz, supra note 167, at 1419-20 (noting that the physical environment of
the public space can provide substantial opportunity for privacy, such as by merging into a
crowd or by interacting with different groups of people in different contexts); Helen Nis-
senbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAw &
PHIL. 559,575-76 (1998) (suggesting that before information technology, there was such a
thing as being "[s] een by hundreds, noticed by none" while in public and assuming either
that one has not been noticed or that each' observer only possesses a discrete bit of infor-
mation about any one individual), Professo ir Lewis Katz also argues that because much of
one's personal life is lived outside the home, the fact that the Court recognizes little to no
Fourth Amendment privacy in the public space means that most aspects of modern life are
denied the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Katz, supra note 87, at 568.
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expectation of privacy" concept is supposed to ensure that societal no-
tions about privacy are incorporated into Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, then the Court's method of differentiating between public and
private seems to fall short." 3
B. Knowing Exposure to the Public
That an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy can de-
pend so significantly on physical boundaries distinguishing public
from private combines with the Supreme Court's knowingly exposed
rationale to constitute a major limitation on an individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 174
 The rea-
son the knowingly exposed rationale has had a major effect on the
scope of the Fourth Amendment is that the Court considers nearly
everything that lies outside physical boundaries as knowingly exposed
to the public."5
 Since the Court articulated its knowingly exposed
logic in Katz, it has used this language, explicitly and implicitly, to
conclude that people have virtually no expectation of privacy in most
areas, items, or information exposed to the public in some way. 176
Commentators have criticized this rationale for many of the same
reasons they disapprove of the Court's method of distinguishing be-
tween public and private.'" They also observe, however, that the ini-
tial premise of the Court's knowingly exposed rationale is sound:
When a person takes something that otherwise is personal and reveals
it in public, that individual invites a degree of public scrutiny, such as
a series of fleeting glances from other members of the public while
one is driving down the street. 178 Yet these commentators then point
out that even though an individual knows some attention from others
is likely, the level of scrutiny the person expects and risks merely by
being in public is not the kind of highly individualized, targeted scru-
tiny imparted by law enforcement. 179 Moreover, social graces—the
178 See supra note 172.
174 See supra notes 162-173 and accompanying text; infra notes 175-202 and accompa-
nying text.
' 75 See supra note 162; see also Katz, supra note 87, at 564 (arguing that the result of the
knowingly exposed rationale has been to "strip the fourth amendment of its normative
values which were intended to regulate and limit the powers of government").
176 See supra note 162.
177 E.g., Katz, supra note 87, at 565.
178 See, e.g., Colb, supra note 87, at 125; Katz, supra note 87, at 565-68; Nissenbaum, su-
pra note 172, at 575-76.
179 See Blitz, supra note 167, at 1408-11; Colb, supra note 87, at 136-37; Katz, supra note
87, at 565-66. Privacy advocates argue that privacy results not simply by preventing expo-
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idea that one can stare back at someone who is staring—prevent the
fleeting glances one expects in public from becoming more intrusive
and lengthier stares. 180 Thus, finding an individual has no expectation
of privacy whatsoever whenever one knowingly exposes something to
the public seems too simple for these commentators. 181 Such an
analysis fails to account for gradations in one's expectations of pri-
vacy—the fact that being in public may diminish expectations of pri-
vacy, but not eliminate them altogether, as the Court's precedent
would hold. 182
An example of the U.S. Supreme Court's all-or-nothing approach
to its knowingly exposed rationale is found in the Court's holding in
1988 in California v. Greenwood. 183 In Greenwood, the Court held the de-
fendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the opaque trash
sure to others, but by controlling the nature of that exposure. See Blitz, supra note 167, at
1408-10; Katz, supra note 87, at 565-66. Although individuals are not able to control what
people think about them when their activities are observed in public, they can manage the
image presented to others in the hope that the appearance presented is accurate. See Blitz,
supra note 167, at 1408-10; see also Nissenbaum, supra note 172, at 581-86 (arguing that
one aspect of privacy is ensuring one's personal information is presented in the appropri-
ate context—that information is not simply freely shifted to a variety of uses).
Moreover, commentators argue that although an individual is unconcerned about his
or her public activities being viewed in isolation, that same individual may feet his or her
privacy has been violated when such details are collected in the aggregate because that
likely reveals much more information. Blitz, supra note 167, at 1408-10. Finally, the tar-
geted, permanent recording of one's activities and movements over time itself may im-
pinge on privacy; commentators argue that such a record limits one's ability to be unen-
cumbered by one's past. E.g., Blitz, supra note 167, at 1411; see also Nissenbaum, supra note
172, at 577-78 (describing technology as providing the ability to accumulate 'ordered,
systematized, and ... permanent" records of what once was "scattered transient" in-
formation in the public sphere).
18° E.g., Blitz, supra note 167, at 1415-17; Colb, supra note 87, at 137-39. As Professor
Sherry Colb argues, If someone stares at us ... in a public place, we tend to notice, Hav-
ing noticed, we can take measures to put a stop to the staring.... Our ability to observe
our observers thus gives us the power to rebuff, confront, and escape invasions of our pri-
vacy. Knowledge is power." Colb, supra note 87, at 137-38.
un See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
182 See, e.g., Colb, supra note 87, at 120-26,153-59 (arguing that the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence improperly equates risk of exposure, for which someone still expects a
measure of privacy, with the renunciation of all privacy); Katz, supra note 87, at 565-66
(suggesting that the Court incorrectly assumes that information disclosed for a limited use
amounts to a complete renunciation of a privacy interest in that information); Andrew E.
Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emo-
tions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125,153-57 (2002) (arguing that because one generally
has power to control aspects of the self that are exposed to others and one can limit such
disclosures, it is possible to maintain privacy in public).
183 See 486 U.S. at 39-41.
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bags they had placed for collection at the curb outside their home. 184
Although the defendants had demonstrated a subjective expectation of
privacy in their trash by using opaque bags, this was not a reasonable
expectation because the defendants had knowingly exposed their trash
to the public by placing it at the curb. 185
 The Court reasoned that it was
widely recognized that anyone could come across a trash bag left at a
curb and decide to open it. 188
 Therefore, the Court concluded, the de-
fendants assumed the risk that police officers might choose to rum-
mage through what the defendants knowingly placed in public.' 87
Without a reasonable expectation of privacy in their trash, police action
to acquire the trash was not a search. 188
The Greenwood dissenting Justices, however, took a more measured
approach to the kind of privacy one can expect in a public space. 188
They argued that the issue was not where the trash was placed, but the
details about the defendants that the trash contained. 18° Moreover, the
only thing the defendants knowingly exposed to the public was the out-
side of the opaque, sealed trash bags. 181
 In the view of the dissenting
Justices, the simple possibility that any member of the public might de-
cide to rummage through the trash bags did not mean the bags' own-
ers relinquished all expectations of privacy in their contents. 192
 In their
view, that possibility might lessen the bag owners' expectation of pri-
vacy, but it did not eliminate it altogether. 183
Twelve years later, in 2000, in Bond v. United States, the Court
seemed to shift slightly toward the more measured view of the
Greenwood dissenting Justices. 194 In Bond, the Court held that a law en-
184 Id.
166 Id.
186 Id. at 40.
187
 /d. at 40-41.
188 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41.
188 See id. at 53-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 50-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reasoned as follows:
A single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recrea-
tional habits of the person who produced it.... Like rifling through desk
drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge
the target's financial and professional status, political affiliations and inclina-
tions, private thoughts, personal relationships, and romantic interests.
Id. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182
 Id. at 54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184
	 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000); Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
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forcement officer's physical manipulation of the defendant's closed,
opaque, soft-sided piece of luggage during a routine border search of
a bus constituted a search tinder the Fourth Amendment. 196 The
Court observed that the defendant knowingly exposed his luggage to
the public by taking it on the bus, and thus he could expect his bag
might be handled or moved by others. 196 He did not expect, ho'rever,
the particular kind of physical manipulation the border patrol officer
conducted—squeezing the soft-sided luggage specifically to detect
hard objects. 197 In this case, the Court acknowledged that knowing
exposure to the public did not translate necessarily into knowing ex-
posure to all law enforcement practices—even though the Court's
reasoning in Greenwood seemed to say the opposite. 198 Thus, unlike in
Greenwood, the Bond Court recognized, at least in that limited context,
that knowing exposure to the public did not eliminate all expectation
of privacy. 199
Regarding GPS tracking devices, a person or vehicle whose loca-
tion is tracked likely is exposing his activities and movements to the
public.20 If there is no expectation of privacy in a public place, then
an individual certainly has no expectation of privacy in his activities
and movements tracked by the GPS device.201 If, instead, knowing ex-
posure to the public diminishes, but does not eliminate, an individ-
ual's expectation of privacy, then that person may maintain some kind
of expectation of privacy in the accumulation of detail about his ac-
tivities and move men ts."2
C. An Individual's Steps to Keep Information Private
Implicit in the Court's knowingly exposed rationale, however, is
the notion that a defendant's steps to ensure something is not ex-
posed to the public inform the decision that the defendant's expecta-
195 Id. at 335-36.
1" Id. at 338.
197 Id. at 336,338-39,
1 °8 See id.; Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41; supra notes 183-193 and accompanying text;
see also Taslitz, supra note 182, at 147-50 (discussing rationale of Bond decision).
1911 See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39; Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-•1.
2110 See Kam, 468 U.S. at 714-16; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
591
 See Knotts, 960 U.S. at 281-82,
2°2 See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39; Katz, supra note 87, at 565-66 (highlighting the notion
of a limited or proportional disclosure—the exposure of information to some but not to
all, or for only a limited purpose).
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tion of privacy was reasonable. 203
 Thus, concerning GPS tracking, the
case for holding the monitoring of such a device constitutes a search
would be stronger if the person being tracked took steps to keep his
location and movements private. 204
 Given that GPS tracking is useful
precisely because it allows users to pinpoint a person's location as he
travels about in open public spaces, this task is virtually impossible. 205
The practical impossibility of protecting against exposure to the
public, however, does not necessarily insulate an individual from gov-
ernment monitoring. 206
 For instance, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
in 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court held that no search occurred when
Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") officials flew over the
2000-acre tract adjacent to a Dow Chemical plant and used a sophisti-
cated mapping camera to take pictures. 207
 Even though Dow Chemical
could not feasibly erect an opaque cover over all 2000 acres in order to
thwart aerial monitoring—meaning it had done all it possibly could to
prevent monitoring—the Court held the industrial acres were know-
ingly exposed to the public. 208
 Because the area was knowingly exposed
to the public, the Court reasoned, government inspectors could fly
overhead to view the area just as any member of the public might
have.209
 The Court also discounted the fact that EPA officials had used
a highly sophisticated commercial mapping camera to take detailed
pictures of the area, stating that the simple fact that human vision was
enhanced to a degree did not itself create constitutional concerns. 210
2" See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,236-38 (1986) (holding the
area surrounding a factory was knowingly exposed to the public through aerial observa-
tion, even though the factory's owners could not feasibly take steps to prevent such obser-
vation); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211-13 (holding that cartilage was knowingly exposed to the
public through aerial observation because the defendant took no steps to prevent such
observation, though he did erect fences to prevent observation from the ground); Katz,
389 U.S. at 352 (noting specifically that the defendant closed the door to the phone booth
before engaging in conversation).
204 See Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 236-38; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211-13; Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
205 See Elliott, supra note 45, at C6; Harmon, supra note 41, at Al; Schwartz, supra note
46, at Cl; Selingo, supra note 41, at G7; see alto Blitz, supra note 167, at 1406-08 (suggesting
that much evidence of people's private lives is available in the public space and that people
often have little choice but to engage in private activities in public); supra notes 43-53 and
accompanying text.
200
	 Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 236-38. But see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-31,34 (holding that
the fact that the defendant could not prevent the public exposure of heat waves was not
dispositive to whether government action amounted to a search).
"7 476 U.S. at 229.
208 See id. at 236-38.
2" Id. at 237-38.
210 Id. at 238.
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Thus, in Dow Chemical, even though the technology of airplanes and
sophisticated cameras virtually prevented the company from blocking
the knowing exposure of its activities, the Court was unwilling to take
this fact into account when finding the company had no expectation of
privacy in the area surrounding its factory. 211
D. Kyllo v. United States: An Alternative Fourth Amendment Test?
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court may be recognizing the
difficulty of continuing to apply the aspect of its knowingly exposed
rationale that places significance on a person's steps to maintain pri-
vacy.212 The Court in its most recent Fourth Amendment case, Kyllo v.
United States, seemed to acknowledge that as technology presents ever-
greater possibilities for intrusion, it also continually decreases the
ability of individuals to keep something private. 215 Accordingly, in ad-
dressing whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in Kyllo,
the Court relied less on the knowingly exposed rationale when ad-
dressing the law enforcement use of a new form of technology. 214
In 2001, in Kyllo, the Court concluded that a search occurred
when law enforcement officials used a thermal imager to detect heat
waves emanating from the defendant's home. 215 As in Dow Chemical, in
which the company could not feasibly cover its industrial acreage, it
was nearly impossible for the Kyllo defendant to have prevented the
knowing exposure of heat waves coming from his home.216 Also as in
Dow Chemical, in which agents flew over Dow Chemical's acreage, gov-
ernment agents in Kyllo engaged in their activities from a vantage
point that required no physical intrusion; Kyllo agents were stationed
across the street and simply aimed the device at the defendant's
home.217 Finally, in both cases, gOvernment agents used technological
211 See id. at 236-39.
212 See infra notes 213-214 and accompanying text.
m See 533 U.S. at 33-36.
214 Sec id. at 33-38.
216 Id. at 29,40. A thermal imager is a device that detects infrared radiation invisible to
the naked eye. Id. at 29. The imager converts the radiation it detects into an image
reflecting the relative amount of heat present in each area; shades of gray deepen as heat
lessens. Id. at 29-30. When law enforcement used the thermal imager at the defendant's
home, it detected a high level of heat along one wall of his home, which allowed agents to
conclude the defendant was using high-intensity heat lamps to grow marijuana in that part
of his home. Id. at 30. Agents then applied for a warrant to search the defendant's home
based in part on data obtained from the thermal imaging scan. Id.
216 See id. at 29-31; Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 236.
217 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30; Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 237.
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devices that provided them much more information than that observ-
able with the naked eye. 213
 Despite these apparent similarities, the
Court reached a different result in Kyllo than it had in Dow Chemical.219
Although the Kyllo Court did distinguish itself from Dow Chemical
by noting that Kyllo involved the home, where Fourth Amendment
protections are heightened, the Kyllo Court also acknowledged more
definitively that it could not ignore the fact that the Fourth Amend-
ment privacy analysis has been affected by technological advances. 2"
After noting that the Katz test is difficult to apply to government uses
of technology, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the Court that a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy simply exists within the home—so the
government's use of technology to acquire information about activi-
ties in the home is necessarily a search. 221
 Although law enforcement
officials did not physically intrude into the defendant's home and
only detected heat waves that were outside physical boundaries and
arguably knowingly exposed to the public, the Court reasoned that
use of the technology was like a physical intrusion into the home. 222
Thus, the Court held that using sense-enhancing technology to
obtain information about activities inside the home—information that
could be obtained only through physical intrusion absent the technol-
ogy—constituted a search, just as a physical intrusion into a home also
would be a search. 223
 The Court added a caveat, however, to this hold-
ing, by indicating that its reasoning worked for technology, such as the
219
 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29; Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238-39. Admittedly, the sophisti-
cated mapping camera used in Dow Chemical enhanced only visual observation, whereas
the thermal imager used in Kyllo revealed what the eye cannot detect. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
29; Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238-39. In distinguishing Dow Chemical, the Kyllo Court said in
part that Dow Chemical stands for the idea that "visual observation is no 'search' at all."
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
219 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 239.
22° 533 U.S. at 33-34, 37.
221 Id. at 34. The Kyllo Court assumed that all details inside a home are intimate and
thereby worthy of protection. Id. at 37-38; see also Kam, 468 U.S. at 714 (reasoning that
"private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of gov-
ernmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that
society is prepared to recognize as justifiable"); United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (noting that the "physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (noting that "[alt the very core* of the Fourth
Amendment is the "right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable government intrusion").
222
 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35, 40.
222
 Id. at 31, 34-35, 40.
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thermal imager, that was not in the "general public use." 224 Yet on the
whole, Kyllo shows that when confronted with technology that could
provide more information than the government could have obtained
through mere visual observation, the Court felt it necessat'y to develop
an alternative test of constitutionality—a test that may or may not mod-
ify a Fourth Amendment analysis of GPS tracking. 225
V. ANALYSIS: RECOGNIZING PRIVACY IN PUBLIC
At first blush, it may seem the constitutionality of the warrantless
monitoring of a GPS tracking device, at least while the device re-
mained on public roads and in public places, is not an open ques-
tion.22° In fact, a cursory analysis of GPS tracking under the Fourth
Amendment would equate GPS tracking devices with the less sophisti-
cated beeper devices addressed in United States v. Knotts and United
States v. Karo.227 Then, given Knotts's pronouncement that a person
traveling in a car in public has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his movements, one would conclude that warrantless GPS tracking is
not a search and thus takes place outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.228
But there are several reasons such an analysis would be mis-
guided.229 First, GPS tracking devices can be distinguished from beep-
ers in several ways that make them both more intrusive and more likely
224 Id. at 34, 40. The Court provided no indication of when a technology becomes
sufficiently pervasive to be considered In general public use" but, rather, assumed that the
thermal imagers at issue in the case were not in public use. See id.; see also id. at 47 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Kyllo, however, thermal im-
agers of the kind used in Kyllo were readily available through toll-free phone numbers and
from half a dozen national companies; tens of thousands of units had been sold nationally.
Id. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Douglas Adkins, Note, The Supreme Court
Announces a Fourth Amendment "General Public Use" Standard for Emerging Technologies but Fails
to Define It: Kyllo v. United States, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 245 (2002) (suggesting various
definitions for a "general public use" standard).
25 See 533 U.S. at 33-34,40. Whether the Court intended to articulate an entirely new
Fourth Amendment test in Kyllo, to be used in future Fourth Amendment cases, is an open
question. Ste, e.g., McKenzie, supra note 87, at 185-87 (suggesting Kyllo developed a new
test because its reasoning deviated from previous Fourth Amendment precedent). Notably,
however, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Kyllo criticized and then did not apply the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test to the thermal imager at issue in the case. Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 34-35.
226 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,714-16 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276,281-82 (1983).
227 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-16; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
222 See Kara, 468 U.S. at 714-16; Know, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
229 See infra notes 230-232 and accompanying text.
694	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:661
to be subject to police abuse than are beepers. 23° In one sense, GPS
tracking devices create the potential for the twenty-four-hour "dragnet-
type" surveillance alluded to in Knotts, where the Court said such con-
stant surveillance would present a different constitutional question
than the beepers at issue. 231
 But more importantly, GPS tracking de-
vices are a technology highlighting the need for the Fourth Amend-
ment to offer protection even within the public space—and language
in Kyllo v. United States suggests the Court is beginning to recognize that
technology often antiquates a Fourth Amendment analysis based purely
on physical boundaries. 232
A. GPS Tracking Versus Beepers
At a base level, GPS devices and beepers are similar; both are ex-
ternal devices that can be covertly installed on something whose loca-
tion is to be tracked. 233
 Though GPS devices and beepers can produce
similar results—they both reveal the tracking device's location at any
given moment—GPS devices possess much greater potential for accu-
racy. 234
 More importantly, GPS devices track location regardless of
whether a GPS receiver, which processes the tracking device's signal to
reveal location information, is in the vicinity.235
 Thus, it is not neces-
sary for police to remain in the vicinity with a receiver to obtain the
GPS device's location information. 236
550 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277-78, 283-84; COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TECHS. INC., supra
note 48; COVERT GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYS., INC., supra note 48.
n' See 460 U.S. at 284; State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (en banc);
Elliott, supra note 45, at C6; COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TECHS., INC., supra note 48; COVERT
GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYS„ INC., supra note 48; see also Blitz, supra note 167, at 1386-88
(suggesting that current location tracking technology means such constant monitoring no
longer is a vision of an 'unlikely future").
"2 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-36 (2001); infra notes 254-279 and ac-
companying text.
HI See Knotty, 460 U.S. at 277-78; Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223; Elliott, supra note 45, at C6;
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TECHS., INC., supra note 48; COVERT GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYS.,
INC., supra note 48.
234 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277-78; Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223; Elliott, supra note 45, at C6;
Grossman & Elift, supra note 33, at 24; Washington, supra note 33, at 1C; Wirbel, supra note
35, at 51; COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TECHS., INC., s-upra note 48; COVERT GPS VEHICLE
TRACKING SYS., INC., supra note 48.
235 See Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223; Balough, supra note 47, at 32-33; Elliott, supra note 45, at
C6; O'Harrow, supra note 42, at El; COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TECHS„ INC., Supra note 48;
COVERT GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYS., INC., supra note 48.
238 See Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223; Elliott, supra note 45, at C6; COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
TECHS. , INC., supra note 48; COVERT GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYS., INC., SUPIT1 note 48.
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This high level of efficiency distinguishes GPS tracking from
beeper usage and, indeed, is one of the reasons GPS tracking is attrac-
tive to law enforcement. 237 The device does the surveillance work for
the police—and makes a computer record of the tracking device's
movements at the same time. 238
 It is theoretically possible, then, espe-
cially as the technology improves, for police to attach a GPS tracking
device on an individual's vehicle and leave it for months at a time,
checking the computer records periodically for suspicious behavior. 239
For this reason, GPS tracking devices have been compared to having a
police officer sitting in a vehicle's back seat twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week—except the driver never knows the officer is there. 24°
The technological differences between GPS technology and
beeper technology are relevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis for
two reasons. 241 First, that the technology functions completely without
police presence makes it less limited by the practical constraints of
available human resources—and thus increases the potential for police
abuse.242 Even though increased efficiency does not automatically mean
the use of a technology is a Fourth Amendment search, it does suggest
a court should approach the technology with greater skepticism. 243
2" See supra notes 47-63 and accompanying text,
2" See Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223; Elliott, supra note 45, at CS; COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
TECHS., INC., supra note 48; COVERT GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYs., INC., Supra note 48.
2" See Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223; Elliott, supra note 45, at C6; COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
TECHS., INC„ supra note 48; COVERT GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYs., INC., supra note 48.
240 See Chau Lam, A Secret Weapon, Follow That Car?, Man. Is Challenging Nassau Police
Evidence Gathered by Planting a GPS Device on His Cat. While Officials Contend No Warrant Is
Required, NEWSDAY, May 1, 2004, at AS (quoting Barbara Bernstein, executive director of
the Nassau County, New York, chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union), 2004 WLNR
1082491; Associated Press, Police Need Warrant to Track with GPS, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 12,
2003, at El (quoting Doug Honig, a spokesman for the American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington), 2003 WLNR 2392338.
241 See infra notes 242-253 and accompanying text.
"2 See Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223; Elliott, supra note 45, at C6; Selingo, supra note 41, at 07;
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TECHs., INC., supra note 48; COVERT GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYS.,
INC., supra note 48; supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text; see also Taslitz, supra note
182, at 165-69 (suggesting that because technologies make the monitoring of individuals
less burdensome, law enforcement may disproportionately use such techniques to target
racial and ethnic minorities and others subject to negative stereotypes).
243 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (reasoning that
"Mlle mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here,
does not give rise to constitutional problems"); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 (explaining that
"[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology
afforded them in this case"). But see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 (explaining that "[w]hile the
technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take ac-
count of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development").
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Second, and more importantly, the differences between GPS
tracking and beeper tracking are relevant to a Fourth Amendment
analysis because they indicate GPS tracking is less like visual surveil-
lance, to which the U.S. Supreme Court analogized beeper tracking in
Knotts and Karo.244 The Knolls Court believed beeper tracking was a
more efficient form of visual surveillance; because visual surveillance
was not a search, the Court's reasoning proceeded, an efficient form
of visual surveillance also was not a search. 245
 Police, after all, should
not have to avert their eyes from what the rest of the public can see. 246
Although this is persuasive reasoning, it fails to take into account
the full nature of what GPS tracking allows an officer to accomplish. 247
GPS tracking is a form of prolonged surveillance that provides law en-
forcement with a comprehensive, detailed, and lengthy record of
someone's movements—a kind of record virtually impossible to obtain
through visual surveillance or even beeper-attendant surveillance, un-
less police resources were unlimited. 248
 The Court's language in Knotts,
that the vehicle driver exposed his movements to "anyone who wanted
to look," merely encapsulates the idea that one in public normally ex-
periences a series of fleeting glances by a variety of individuals over
time .249
Such reasoning fails to grasp that tracking and recording move-
ments—a kind of license to stare—constitutes an entirely different
invasion of privacy. 250
 Even though one may expect fleeting glances in
public, and police should not have to avert their eyes from what they
can see in public, one does not thereby expect the kind of targeted
aggregation of data a GPS device collects on one's movements, par-
ticularly a kind of surveillance the individual neither can detect nor
244 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-16; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
245 See 460 U.S. at 281-82; see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (not-
ing that visual surveillance is lawful because the eye cannot by the laws of England be
guilty of a trespass'") (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng.
Rep. 807 (KB. 1765)); Blitz, supra note 167, at 1384-86 (analyzing the Court's comparison
of beeper tracking technology to an enhanced form of visual surveillance).
246 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment has never required police to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfares").
247 See infra notes 248-253 and accompanying text.
246
 See supra notes 234-240 and accompanying text; see also Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
24° See 460 U.S. at 281-82; see also Colb, supra note 87, at 134-36.
25°
 Blitz, supra note 167, at 1416; Colb, supra note 87, at 134-36; Taslitz, supra note 182,
at 169-71.
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prevent.251 An individual walking or driving in public engages in pro-
portional disclosure analogous to the Court's reasoning in Bond v.
United Stater. That person knowingly exposes to others bits and pieces
of his movements and activities, but he does not knowingly expose his
movements and activities to all law enforcement practices. 252 In this
way, the kind of sophisticated surveillance provided by GPS tracking
devices is fundamentally different, for privacy purposes, from visual
surveillance. 255
B. A Proposal for a Changed Definition of Public and Private
What is most intuitively bothersome about GPS tracking technol-
ogy is not so much that it allows police to obtain location information
per se, but that it enables police to do so for a much longer period of
time, with much less chance for detection, and with little idea of the
justifications prompting such monitoring. 254 The resultant lengthy,
detailed record of one's location then provides a comprehensive pic-
ture of one's life.255 Location information reveals everything from
daily habits like stopping at the same coffee shop on the way to work,
to associations with other people, to visits to locales that reveal much
more about a person's particular characteristics, affiliations, or be-
liefs—such as a gay bar; a doctor's office, HIV testing facility, or abor-
251 See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMER-
ICA 15-16 (2000) (noting that social norms—such as the fact that it is considered rude to
stare—guide both individuals' conduct and their expectations of others' conduct while
both are in public); Thslitz, supra note 182, at 170 (suggesting that a person can sanction
others' staring when he is aware of it; the person "may glare back, grimace, express dis-
taste, or verbally protest").
252 See 529 U.S. 334,338-39 (2000); Blitz, supra note 167, at 1358 (noting that much of
life is lived in public and though some details are private, their exposure to others is lim-
ited and unlike how law enforcement would use such information); Colb, supra note 87, at
135-36 (arguing that people perceive visual surveillance and tracking movements as en-
tirely different activities); Katz, supra note 87, at 565-66 (suggesting that people share in-
formation with limited groups and for limited purposes—and that police would apply a
more focused and less expected examination of the information).
2" See supra notes 244-252 and accompanying text.
254 See Elliott, supra note 45, at C6; Grossman & Hift, supra note 33, at 24; Washington,
supra note 33, at IC; Wirbel, supra note 35, at 51; COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TECIIS., INC.,
supra note 48; COVERT GPS VEHICLE TRACKING SYS., INC., supra note 48.; sec also Jackson, 76
P.3d at 224 (holding GPS tracking constituted a "particularly intrusive method of surveil-
lance" because of the kind of detail it records); Blitz, supra note 167, at 1407 (arguing that
mass tracking gathers a great amount of detail about people's lives by taking advantage of
the fact that much evidence of people's private lives exists outside physical boundaries).
"5 See Harmon, supra note 41, at Al; Q'Harrow, supra note 42, at El; Selingo, supra
note 41, at G7; see also Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
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tion clinic; a certain church, synagogue, or mosque; a strip club; or
various political and civic organizations.256
1. Protecting the Features of Society That Preserve Privacy
For this reason, simply claiming one has no expectation of pri-
vacy in one's travels on public roads misses the point. 257 Rather than
merely providing an account of one's travels on public roads, GPS
tracking also offers a significant amount of detail about one's life. 258
 It
is the accumulation of those personal details that the Fourth
Amendment should protect, despite the fact that they are not
shielded from public view by physical boundaries. 259 Taking seriously
the Court's pronouncement in Katz v. United States that the Fourth
Amendment protects people instead of places, the Fourth Amend-
ment would encompass the features of society that protect the per-
sonal information recorded by GPS tracking devices. 260
 Without pro-
viding protection for those features, the behavior of individuals would
256 See Jackson, 76 F.3d at 223 (In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast
number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails and
foibles. The GPS tracking devices record all of these travels, and thus can provide a de-
tailed picture of one's life.").
2" See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text.
258 See Blitz, supra note 167, at 1363 (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment protects
the privacy of people in places, not the privacy of the places themselves—so that its protec-
tions should move with people as they leave their homes and move about in public); Jef-
frey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy
Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27,
33-34 (1995) (proposing that tracking data about one's movements would be combined
with existing databases, creating a much more significant threat to privacy).
258
 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (indicating that because technology has affected the Fourth
Amendment, the issue to be addressed in the case was 'what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy"); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630
(remarking that "Lilt is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property" that is to be prevented); Blitz,
supra note 167, at 1363-65 (arguing that the best way to secure privacy in public is to iden-
tify and protect the features of society, and of the public space, that encapsulate the kind
of privacy expected under the Fourth Amendment); Nissenbaum, supra note 172, at 593
(arguing that physical boundaries should not define privacy because 'values placed in
jeopardy from invasions of the intimate realm are also jeopardized by various forms of
public surveillance practiced today"); Reiman, supra note 258, at 29 (suggesting that "UN
we direct our privacy-protection efforts at reinforcing our doors and curtains, we may miss
the way in which modern means of information collection threaten our privacy by gather-
ing up the pieces of our public lives and making them visible from a single point").
260 See 389 U.S. 347,352-53 (1967) (holding that the reach of the Fourth Amendment
does not turn upon the presence or absence of physical intrusion into an enclosure and is
not limited to searches and seizures of tangible property); supra note 259.
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change; one no longer could assume one's activities are not being
watched and recorded for later analysis by government officials.=
Therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis better equipped to handle
changes brought about by technology would focus less on physical
boundaries and more on whether allowing the law enforcement prac-
tice at issue would alter the degree of privacy experienced by society
before the technology existed.=
2. A Kyllo-Based Rationale
More generally, technology has changed traditional distinctions
between public and private by breaking down physical boundaries
that once shielded the private from the public, thereby increasing the
ability of law enforcement to obtain such information and decreasing
individuals' ability to maintain privacy.= In the context of GPS track-
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L Rcv. 349,
403 (1974) (arguing that unchecked surveillance means the amount of privacy and free-
dom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of
free and open society"); Katz, supra note 87, at 562 (suggesting that knowing one's actions
are being watched keeps one on guard, limiting the fulfillment of the human potential);
Reiman, supra note 258, at 37-38 (arguing that knowing one's actions may be observed
and recorded eliminates the individual's sense of freedom to act spontaneously).
282 See supra notes 257-261 and accompanying text. This view is similar to that advo-
cated by Justice Harlan in 1971 in his dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. White. See 401 U.S. 745, 786-87 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather than
referring to the reasonable expectation of privacy test he had outlined in Katz, Justice
Harlan indicated that a better test of Fourth Amendment protections required an assess-
ment of the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the indi-
vidual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law
enforcement." Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In White, justice Harlan argued that bug-
ging a suspect's conversations with a government informant should require a warrant un-
der the Fourth Amendment because should such a practice become widespread, people
would begin to measure their words—"smother[ing] that spontaneity—reflected in frivo-
lous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discourse—that liberates daily life." Id. at 787
(Harlan, J., dissenting), Thus, only a few years after Katz, Justice Harlan moved away from
a physical boundary-based analysis of the Fourth Amendment to focus on how police prac-
tices could alter the nature of the freedoms and privacy the Amendment secures. See id. at
786-87 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
288 See Nissenbaum, supra note 172, at 564, 575-76 (noting that traditional legal and
philosophical theories of privacy have been ill-equipped to deal with technology and
threats to privacy in public because they focus on notions of intimate, private realms);
Reiman, supra note 258, at 29, 33 (describing the kind of informational picture of an indi-
vidual provided by computer databases collecting a variety of personal data); McKenzie,
supra note 87, at 153-54 (suggesting the advancement of technology has provided access to
information otherwise obtainable only through physical intrusion). Not only does tech-
nology help break down physical boundaries, but people in modern society also conduct
more of their activities in public. Katz, supra note 87, at 568. The fact that more of one's
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ing, technological advancements in general suggest that a Fourth
Amendment analysis should not assume that all information available
outside physical boundaries necessarily is "public" information, avail-
able for the taking. 264
 This point is contemplated, to an extent, by Jus-
tice Scalia's majority opinion in Kyllo.265
Even though Justice Scalia's ultimate conclusion was that all de-
tails within the home merit protection—a location-based decision—
he may have paved the way for a more expansive way of thinking
about the Fourth Amendment where technology is concerned. 266 In-
stead of conceiving of the Fourth Amendment as protecting only what
physical boundaries shield from government intrusion, the Kyllo
Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment, at a minimum, pro-
tects those characteristics and features of life and society that provide
and ensure privacy—one of which, in that case, was the physical
boundary surrounding the home. 267
Therefore, drawing from Kyllo, although a Fourth Amendment
analysis can continue to rely on physical boundaries to demarcate
those places whose physical features guarantee privacy (hence, Justice
Scalia's insistence that the home simply is protected), it simultane-
ously also must protect the features of society that provide the level of
privacy originally contemplated by the Framers—or at least, that de-
gree of privacy experienced before the technology existed. 268 Tech-
nology has allowed law enforcement to gain easy access to informa-
tion that the Framers (or modern society before the technology was
invented) would have expected to keep private because of physical
boundaries or otherwise. 269 Therefore, to maintain a consistent level
of privacy in the face of continued advances in technology, the Fourth
life is lived in public, given the characteristics of modern society, only adds to the need to
recognize some privacy in public. See id.
264 See supra notes 254-263 and accompanying text.
265 See 533 U.S. at 33-34 (indicating that Kyllo involved more than naked-eye surveil-
lance, that the question was how much technological enhancement was too much, and
that technology has affected the level of privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment).
266 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 37; see also St. Lawrence, supra note 87, at 169-73 (arguing
the Kyllo decision provides a first step toward rebuilding principles of privacy first estab-
lished in Katz). But see McKenzie, supra note 87, at 179 (suggesting the Kyllo test is unwork-
able and only creates further confusion).
267 See 533 U.S. at 33-34. The test the Kyllo Court created, prohibiting the use of tech-
nology to obtain information that otherwise only would have been accessible through
physical intrusion, implicitly acknowledges that technology has made it possible to perme-
ate boundaries absent physical intrusion. See id.
265 See id.; see also supra note 259 and accompanying text.
269 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34; supra notes 259-262 and accompanying text.
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Amendment must preserve not merely those physical boundaries but
also those less physical features that also provide privacy. 2"
3. Why Monitoring a GPS Tracking Device Would Be a Search
If such a Fourth Amendment analysis were applied to GPS track-
ing, the monitoring of a GPS tracking device, even while it moved
along open roads and streets, would be considered a search. 271 The
technology allows for an extensive accumulation of detail about a per-
son's life, beyond what is practically possible to obtain through visual
surveillance, and that detail is recorded in a computer database acces-
sible to law enforcement at any time. 272 Widespread use of such a
powerful technology, without judicial supervision, could trigger the
assumption that one's movements are being tracked and recorded at
any given moment—creating the potential that individuals would alter
their behavior to accommodate this perception.275 Such a result dem-
onstrates that GPS technology impinges on the aspects of the public
space that people now rely upon to establish a degree of privacy as
they move about in public.274 Because the Fourth Amendment under
this proposed interpretation protects the features of society that pre-
serve privacy, the Fourth Amendment would consider the monitoring
of a GPS tracking device to be a search, requiring a warrant based on
probable cause. 275 In that event, judges would ensure that police track
a suspect's location with GPS devices only when they possess sufficient
justification and only for a time period appropriate to the purposes of
the investigation.278
"0
 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34. As commentator Jonathan Blitz argues,
[Dust as the device of 'constitutionally-protected zones" in twentieth-century
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence gave individuals the power to decide for
themselves what to shield in a home, office, or a suitcase, so twenty-first cen-
tury Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should similarly recognize that the
object of Fourth Amendment protections in public space is to guarantee
that the public sphere retains a character that continues to provide individu-
als the opportunities to preserve privacy where they believe they need it.
Blitz, supra note 167, at 1414-15; see supra note 259 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 272-276 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 254-258 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 259-262 and accompanying text.
474
 See supra notes 259-262 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 254-270 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; see also Katz, supra note 87, at 577
(noting that the Fourth Amendment guarantees "important decisions like search and sei-
zure ... are determined by neutral and detached judges"). Providing constitutional pro-
tections in public also does not mean that police could not engage in public surveillance;
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Of course, whether the Supreme Court will continue to expand
on the rationale expressed in the Kyllo decision is an open question,
and the extent to which the Court's "general public use" caveat will
affect future cases also is unknown. 277
 For a technology like GPS track-
ing, which is used widely by the public, this caveat could prevent GPS
tracking from constituting a search if the Court takes seriously its lan-
guage in Kytio.2" GPS technology is used daily by millions of Ameri-
cans—a level meeting any definition of "general public use."279
C. An Alternative Proposal: Statutory Protection
Fourth Amendment applicability to one's movements in public,
in relation to GPS tracking, is uncertain under the U.S. Supreme
Court's existing precedent. 28° Accordingly, until the Court addresses
the issue, a statutory framework could fulfill some of the same privacy-
protecting goals through provisions that would guide the circum-
stances in which federal and state law enforcement agencies can em-
ploy GPS tracking devices. 281
 Though tracking devices currently are
rather, it simply means the government must justify its actions when it does so—and that
the default position is no [public] surveillance." Taslitz, supra note 182, at 174.
2" See supra note 224 and accompanying text; see also Slobogin, supra note 87, at 1394-
96 (examining various implications for interpretation of the "general public use" excep-
tion); McKenzie, supra note 87, at 179 (suggesting that the Kyllo test is unworkable in the
long run and to different types of technology and was a missed opportunity to clarify the
Fourth Amendment's relation to technology).
278 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Slobogin, supra note 87, at 1394-96; Adkins, supra note 224,
at 252; McKenzie, supra note 87, at.179; see also Global Market to Top $22 Billion, supra note
40; Harmon, supra note 41; Selingo, supra note 41; Wirbel, supra note 35, at 51. As Justice
Stevens' dissent in Kyllo pointed out, however, a "general public use" exception to the
Court's test in Kyllo would lead to perverse results—allowing police use of technology and
thereby increasing the threat to privacy as the use of intrusive, high-tech equipment be-
comes more widespread. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Given this potential
result and the majority opinion's lack of clarity of the "general public use" exception, it is
unclear how much weight the Court would grant this exception in a future Fourth
Amendment analysis. See Slobogin, supra note 87, at 1394-96,1402-06 (analyzing and sug-
gesting definitions for "general public use" exception); Adkins, supra note 224, at 252-53
(highlighting the lack of clarity of the "general public use" exception).
no See Global Market to Top $22 Billion, supra note 40; Harmon, supra note 41; Selingo,
supra note 41; Wirbel, supra note 35, at 51; see also supra note 278 and accompanying text.
le° See supra notes 226-232 and accompanying text.
28' See Blitz, supra note 167, at 1420-21 (highlighting reasons to prefer statutory pro-
tections over constitutional protections against privacy infringement from technology used
by police); Kerr, supra note 85, at 838,858-60 (articulating reasons the Fourth Amend-
ment cannot provide sufficient protection of privacy); Lee, supra note 47, at 402-03 (sug-
gesting legislatures should act to protect location data, absent a change in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence); Slobogin, supra note 87, at 1433-37 (suggesting a legislative
approach to ensure privacy from public surveillance technology).
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addressed in a federal statute, that statute does not direct or restrict
law enforcement use of the technology. 282
At a minimum, a more comprehensive statute would require po-
lice to justify their actions to a judge or magistrate, based on probable
cause or some lesser degree of suspicion that the suspect's movements
would lead police to evidence of a crime. 283 The judge, then, 'could
allow a tracking device to be installed for a limited period of time—
perhaps ten days—with renewals possible if the judge finds police
continue to have sufficient justification for monitoring. 284 Finally, such
a statute would provide for the sealing and eventual destruction of
location information when the investigation ended, in an attempt to
prevent the unnecessary accumulation of such information. 285
This kind of statutory protection at least would ensure some rec-
ords were kept of police usage of tracking devices and provide that a
neutral, detached magistrate—rather than an "officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"—decides when
such governmental intrusion is justified. 286 Nevertheless, holding the
monitoring of a GPS tracking device is a search under the Fourth
Amendment is preferable to a statutory scheme because such a result
would signal a shift in how the Fourth Amendment applies to other
technologies that collect information available in the public sphere. 287
282 See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2000); United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950 (6th Cir.
2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom. by Garner v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1050 (2005);
United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
288 See Katz, supra note 87, at 568-69 (arguing that without judicial supervision, society
relies only on government officials voluntarily to respect privacy—and that "[r]eliance
alone on government self-restraint is a very weak foundation on which to support a com-
modity as fragile as individual freedom"),
284 See Kerr, supra note 85, at 850-55 (describing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and arguing its provisions governing the use of wiretap-
ping—which include procedures for proving justification, a time limit for a single wiretap
placement, and a requirement for the sealing and destruction of recorded evidence—
show how a statute can address privacy concerns not abated by the Fourth Amendment),
288 See id. at 851-52.
288 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (explaining that the warrant
requirement exists to interpose a neutral and detached magistrate between the citizen and
the officer—a step necessary to protect Fourth Amendment privacy interests); see also Katz,
389 U.S. at 356-57 (holding that although law enforcement agents in the case acted with
restraint in conducting the search, that restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not
by a judicial officer—and agents' restraint could not substitute for a lack of judicial process).
287
 See supra notes 254-279 and accompanying text.
704	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 46:661
CONCLUSION
GPS tracking technology constitutes a threat to personal freedom
from government intrusion precisely because it involves the collection
of data about one's movements in the public space—an area where,
under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, individuals lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy such that police action must occur
pursuant to a warrant. Although the U.S. Supreme Court generally
has held that individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in
activities occurring within the public space or knowingly exposed to
the public, GPS tracking presents a case for shifting this rationale be-
cause of the sheer amount of personal information such devices
gather from the public space. In light of GPS tracking and other
technologies functioning in the public space, the Supreme Court
should shift its Fourth Amendment analysis to one that preserves
some privacy within the public space and guarantees that technology
does not further increase the capacity of police to collect personal
data without any kind of physical intrusion. Such an analysis would
avoid definitions of privacy based on physical boundaries, but instead
would protect those features of society that provide privacy—and en-
sure privacy is maintained to the degree it existed before such tech-
nologies like GPS tracking. In this way, the Fourth Amendment once
again will begin to secure the kind of privacy that truly sustains liberty.
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